This paper originates from my work on`social agents'. An important issue in this kind of research is the dynamic coupling of an agent with its social and non-social environment. Additionally I consider`internal dynamics' inside an agents as a basic step towards understanding. The paper therefore focusses on the internal and external dynamics which couple an agent to its environment. The rst part of this paper discusses the issue of embodiment in animals and artifacts and its relation to`social dynamics.' I argue that embodiment is linked to a concept of a body and is not necessarily given when running a control program on robot hardware. For this purpose I introduce the concept of`body image'. Additionally, I stress the individual characteristics of an embodied cognitive system, as well as its social embeddedness. I outline the framework of a physical-psychological state-space which changes dynamically in a self-modifying way as a holistic approach towards embodied human and arti cial cognition. This framework is meant to discuss internal and external dynamics of an embodied, natural or arti cial agent. In order to stress the importance of a dynamic memory I introduce the concept of an`autobiographical agent'. The second part of the paper gives an example of the implementation of a physical agent, a robot, which is dynamically coupled to its environment by balancing on a seesaw. For the control of the robot a behavior-oriented approach using the dynamical systems metaphor is used. The problem is studied through building a complete and co-adapted robot-environment system. A seesaw which varies its orientation with one or two degrees of freedom is used as the arti cial`habitat'. The problem of stabilizing the body axis by active motion on a seesaw is solved by using two inclination sensors and a parallel, behavior-oriented control architecture. Some experiments are described which demonstrate the exploitation of the dynamics of the robot-environment system.
Embodiment in Animals and Artifacts: Introduction
For several years the`New Arti cial Intelligence' approach ( 8] , 22]) put emphasis on the study of embodied agents, namely robots, interacting in a real environment. Recently new kind of projects have appeared, trying to scale-up from relatively simple, mostly reactive systems towards cognitive systems, e.g. including language skills 34] or trying to achieve the developmental cognitive state of a two-year old child 6]. But instead of the common agreement that cognition can only develop in a body and through its interactions with the environment, the concept of embodiment has mostly been reduced to the fact of possessing and controlling a body, i.e having an internal control program which uses the body as an actuator device. However, there is much evidence to support the assumption that cognitive capabilities are only possible through the interaction of body and mind, i.e. that the body is not simply used by the mind, but that there is a co-development and mutual shaping of cognitive abilities on the one hand and bodily skills and experiences on the other hand. The body is not a xed and pregiven`actuator device', but it is a dynamic and ontogenetically evolving entity. Evidence from brain sciences and neuropsychology stress the mutual dependence of body and mind/personality. In the following sections I outline some aspects which I consider important to the design of embodied cognitive robots motivated by evidence from research in natural sciences. The concept of body image`is central to this view. Body image refers to a dynamic construction process, it is not a static entity. The constructivist and dynamic nature of my conception of embodiment is described in more detail in the following sections. I sketch the concept of a physical-psychological state-space as a possible common framework for embodied cognitive architectures making the link between internal and external dynamics of an agent embedded in its environment. This concept is not meant as a technical speci cation for the construction of an embodied system. Instead, it is meant to give some insights into general design guidelines for arti cial embodied agents. For instance: if we take the holistic approach towards embodiment seriously then this would mean that the modi cation of a robot (adding additional wheels, manipulators or sensors) should in uence not only its bodily skills but also its cognition. The general methodology of an incremental and modular construction of a robot has to face the underlying assumption of a modular nature of cognition!
Bodily Experiences in Real and Simulated Worlds
If we run a control program on a robot hardware platform (with real sensors, actuators, and in a real environment) why should this necessarily ful ll the embodiment criterion? Of course, the behavior of a real world robot is usually di erent from that of a simulated robot-environment system. But is this not mainly a matter of whether the complexity of nature and its laws can be captured by a computer program? There have been various discussions on the`simulation versus real world' debate which should not be reviewed here (e.g. 5]). In my view, the debate itself is not very useful in the sense of trying to nd the`right answer' to the question of what environment to chose for arti cial intelligence or arti cial life research. Humans are from their early childhood on experts at taking various abstract or ctional entities for real (comprising comic, television-, or video game characters, football teams as well as political theories and religion). What counts is in my view the question of what is real to the embodied mind of an individual person. Following the argumentation of radical constructivism (e.g. 25]) it should be more useful to discuss about the individual's constructed conception of reality (Wirklichkeit) than about an objective reality. The meaning, and not the technological basis is central. In this way, experiences which are important to the life of an individual should be taken seriously, no matter if they originate in real, simulated, virtual or ctional experiences. But, and this leads us back to the issue of embodiment, why is it nevertheless possible for humans to distinguish easily between real experiences and those watched on television, or read in a novel? My hypothesis is that humans use their body actively in order to test the environment. Bodily interacting with the world is the easiest way to learn about the world, because it directly provides meaning, context, thè right' perspective, and sensory feedback. Moreover, it gives information about the believability of the world and the position of the agent within this world.
Thus, I propose to use as a test for an embodied robot a discrimination task.
Here, the robot has to distinguish between having simulated or`real' sensory information. This distinction can be easily performed by humans using di erent mechanisms related to perception and sensation of the world (see 30]). I assume that the development of a`conception' of the body, which is generally discussed as the acquisition of a`body image' or`body schema' (see next section), is necessary for embodied action and cognition. The conception of`body sensation' and awareness can be used to distinguish simulated and real stimuli, e.g. observing the consequences of one's actions, and interactions with the environment, on the body. Additionally, the morphology of a natural body has evolved in phylogeny in close interdependency with, and mutual adaptation to the animate and inanimate environment. In the same way in ontogeny the body is shaped by the environment on the basis of given dispositions (see Maturana's ideas on structural coupling). Transferring this idea to artifacts implies the careful design and adaptation of a robot's body to the environment. In principle the design itself has to be evolvable and self-redesignable. An ideal solution would be bridging of the gap between (robot) hardware and software level, although the idea of realizing evolvable robots with an adaptation of both body and control mechanisms in a close interdependency is still a future goal (see rst steps towards evolvable hardware in 36]). Some of the arguments given in the following subsections are described in more detail in a joint paper with Thomas Christaller, see 16]).
Body Images
Body image' is a very ill-de ned concept. Despite the huge amount of literature on body images which have been published, its de nition varies widely. Slade 28] considers`body image' as a \loose mental representation of the body's shape, form and size". He identi ed at least seven sets of factors which a ect its development and manifestation, including historical, cultural and social, individual and biological factors. Most of these factors are highly dynamic, i.e. varying over time on di erent time scales. Slade regards the history of sensory input to body experience as the basis for the general`mental representation of the body'. A combination with at least another kind of variable, the biological variables which might change from day-today, indicates the time-changing manifestation of`body image'. Therefore I suggest a`dynamical system' point of view of`body image'. Instead of viewing a`body image' as a static, structural entity within the brain (a typical`model' which can, for instance, be implemented in schemata-like representations which are traditionally used in many arti cial intelligence approaches) it might be useful to consider`body image' as a speci c manifestation of the dynamics of a state-space built up by cognitive and bodily variables. This point is elaborated further in subsection 1.6.
Individual bodies
Every natural system has a unique body and a unique personality. Even twins with identical genome equipment are not`equivalent' (in a mathematical sense). Every person collects individual experiences during his/her lifetime. Even if they are physically close together their viewpoints and perspectives are never identical. This leads to a number of consequences of being an embodied system: Bodies are physical entities and occupy a distinct volume in space at a speci c time. No other individual can have the same position in space and time.
In our perception of human`reality' we use the metaphor of a 3-dimensional space for locating objects and interacting with objects. We also locate our body, limb movements and interactions with other objects in this geometrical space. The shape of the body changes during active movements or contacts with other objects. The body shows characteristic symmetrical and asymmetrical features concerning movement, and position and orientation of the sensors (two eyes, two legs, one nose etc.). Speci c design details are due to the phylogenetic development and adaptation to the environment, e.g. upright walking, the head as the carrier of main distance sensors (vision, sound) etc. This speci c`design' determines our way of acting and interacting, e.g. approaching objects with the`frontal' side of the body, head and eyes oriented towards objects of interest etc.
In order to preserve the integrity of the body important mechanisms for organisms are to detect contact with or distance to other objects. Controlling the spatio-temporal interaction with the environment is necessary in order to avoid physical injury or to achieve goals (moving from one place to another, manipulating objects etc.) The active exploration of the environment through body movement is highly important for learning about the environment and the development of cognition. The second-hand knowledge of watching the world from a distance can only complement, but never replace rst-person experiences of actively interacting with the environment. It seems to be very unlikely that a child who is prevented to move will develop full cognitive abilities which are characteristic of humans.
Body as a social tool
The human species is the species where the most elaborated forms of`self-manipulation' of the body can be found. This includes decorating the body, actively manipulating its shape (e.g. through increase or decrease of weight) or using it as a`device' for social communication: using markers on the body in order to indicate profession and the position in a social hierarchy or using the body as a`social tool' for threatening or as a`social stage' to present a certain role or attitude. In 35] Anthony Synnott argues that the human body, its attributes, functions, organs and the senses are not given', but socially constructed. The body should be seen as a \social category with di erent meanings imposed and developed by every age and by di erent sectors of the population". The human species is also the species where the most complex social interactions can be found. Humans are social animals, they grow up in a society. Survival in a socieity has proved to be very successful. Primatologist discuss whether the development of social intelligence was a mile stone in the development of human intelligence in general (see 14] ). As a consequence members of a social group need to tolerate to have conspeci cs more or less close to their own body. Certain`regions' (distances around the body) developed in association with the behavior repertoire which can be executed within these regions. The closer conspeci cs can approach one's own body, the stronger is usually the degree of familiarization (social bonding) with this person. Therefore social spaces around our body do not only represent the physical distance of an object, this space is associated with an emotionally colored behavior repertoire. In social interactions the distance to a group member indicates the social status and the goals and interests of both individuals.
1.5 Experiential, bodily understanding \Das wissenschaftliche Denken -ein Uberblicksdenken, ein Denken des Gegenstands in seiner Allgemeinheit -mu sich in ein vorausgehendes`Es gibt' zur uckversetzen, in die Landschaft, auf den Boden der sinnf alligen Welt und der bearbeiteten Welt, wie sie in unserem Leben, f ur unseren K orper vorhanden sind, nicht f ur jeden m oglichen K orper, den man, wenn man will, als eine Informationsmaschine betrachten kann, sondern f ur diesen tats achlichen K orper, den ich den meinen nenne, diesen Wachtposten, der schweigend hinter meinen Worten und meinen Handlungen steht." ( 21] , cited in 3])
In 17] Mary Galbraith discusses di erent meanings of understanding in computationalism and the continental`verstehen' Tradition. In the latter, phenomenological approach bodily experiences and social interaction are central to understanding, thought, perception. Experiencing is here described as the \concretely present ow of feelings". According to Galbraith computationalism is based on an explanatory notion of understanding, as a \detached logical and propositional knowledge of phenomena from the position of a spectator, guaranteed to be valid by experimental repeatability." The notion of understanding in the verstehen originated in hermeneutic, historical sciences and arts. In this notion of understanding we understand each other's actions and words not as physically caused, but as a dialogical relationship in which we interpret meaning from each other's gestures on the basis of our individual reality (continuous, lived experience amid humanly meaningful contexts). For example, understanding of a novel leads to involvement, new lived experience and new understanding (in a unique way for each individual at a certain period of time). Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of mind and language uses the concept of a lived body, \We inhabit language because and in the the same way we inhabit our bodies in the world. One enters into language, as one enters into the physical world, by taking up a bodily position within it. Understanding the world and language happens through living it" (see 3] for a discussion of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy).
As Barbara Becker 3] points out the invention of new methods in arti cial intelligence and cognitive science for modelling cognition like connectionism, distributed arti cial intelligence, arti cial life have not changed the global`program' of computationalism, namely that computer programs are interpreted as theoretical models or theories (or at least as heuristics) which give explanations for human cognitive processes. In general I agree to this viewpoint, but we think that these methods, especially approaches in arti cial life which are concerned with the construction of embodied robotic agents, when used in a di erent context can provide a way to overcome the computationalistic/phenomenological gap. I consider two mechanims as crucial to a form of (social) understanding which can bridge this gap, namely (1) the bodily, experiential dynamics of empathic resonance, and (2) the biographic re-construction of a communication situation. I discuss these issues in detail in 15]. subjective world of internal re-constructions, "Wirklichkeit" sensori-motor "interface" to the world perceived social and non-social "reality" Many dynamic systems approaches towards embodied agents assume that the state spaces are built out of dimensions which represent parameters of the body. In robotics research sensors are used to measure the physical state of the body (external and internal sensors) and these abstractions are input to calculations within a mathematical framework. This one-way-direction leads to problems which are frequently discussed especially in arti cial intelligence, including e.g. debates about the best kind of representation (the propositional versus analog debate) and the`frame problem'. Many problems like this arise from the`representation point of view', i.e. the assumption that physical states can be measured, modeled and represented and used for further algorithmic or symbolic calculations without providing a direct way back to the physical basis. In order to account for the feedback we introduce in 16] a multi-dimensional state-space as a physical-psychological unity which is an interaction-space of agent-environment interactions and of the processes going on within the agent which is situated in a world with dynamic social and non-social interactions (see g. 1). Thus, the physical-psychological state-space is supposed to be a framework for coupling internal (inside an agent) and external (agent-environment) dynamics. The main underlying assumptions and characteristics of this concept are summarized as follows: a) There are no abstract, disembodied models in the brain of humans or other animals. Physical states are not transformed to abstract values in order to build up internal models.
b) The physical-psychological state-space consists of dimensions with links to physical states (location of body parts, proprioception, emotional states etc.). The dimensions of the state-space consist of direct physical links to the body, as they are found in humunculi-like projections in the brain. c) In the physical-psychological state-space trajectories are perceptions, actions, and`mental units' of thought and remembering. In this way there is no di erence between storage and retrieval of entities. Instead both refer to a construction process. In this state-space all experiences are intuitively related to the body and its history.
d) Remembering means re-construction of a trajectory, which is (by de nition of the state-space) related to the actual physical state of the body. The actual physical state is pushed towards a state which results in a trajectory as close as possible to the remembered one. Therefore there are no two identical results of`memory retrieval'. Every retrieval process means rewriting and modi es its content (see 24]). Learning is not separated from remembering. The issue of dynamic memory and remembering processes from technical as well as neuropsychological viewpoints is dicussed in more detail in 16].
e) If bodily characteristics or the physical links between body and state-space change, the dimensions of the state-space change accordingly. In the same way after amputations of body parts, e.g. ngers, the sensorimotor projections in the brain change. A set of dimensions may have links to internal emotional states 1 . Changes in these domains might therefore dominate, suppress or activate other domains and lead to crucial changes of the whole state-space. Body images both of oneself and of others could be characterized by attractors in the physical-psychological state-space. This might explain why changes in the emotional states might lead to distortion of the conception of one's body. In the same way certain physical behaviors or habits might in uence the emotional attitude towards the body.
A dynamic systems approach has already gained much attention in child development. For instance in 29] di erent researchers try to model and analyse existing data from child development in the framework of`dynamic systems'. The hypothesis that cognitive systems are dynamical systems and can be understood as such (in contrast to the computational hypothesis, namely that cognitive systems are computers and cognition is computation) is discussed by Tim van Gelder in 37]. In the case of social understanding one of the challenging points for speci ying a model ac- 1 The issue of emotions and its connections to the physical-psychological state-space has to be developed further. One alternative viewpoint is that the temporal organisation of the dynamics are what (from an observer point of view) is considered as emotions.
cording to the dynamical systems approach could be to identify an appropriate level and de ning variables and parameters (which can provide the coupling to the social environement) appropriately in order to capture the essential aspects of empathic re-experiencing and re-construction.
It is not at all clear how a dynamic model of a`re-experiencing arti cial mind' can look like and how it could be implemented. Nevertheless, the dynamic systems approach has already be used for controlling robots, e.g. when the behavior of robots is modeled as attractors 33] and can be used for the development of concepts 19]. 
The autobiographic agent
On the basis of the aspects which we described in the previous sections I like to introduce the concept of an autobiographic agent (see g. 2).
In my view the constructive remembering and re-collection processes should always been seen in the life-long perspective, i.e. referring to the autobiographic aspect as an ongoing re-construction of the own history and creating the concept of individual personality. The approach to focus on the life-long aspect of human memory is in line with research which has been done in psychology on autobiographic memories (e.g. 12]). The topic memory should not be the central focus of this paper, but nevertheless I consider it to be a crucial point in the construction of cognitive systems and modelling of social dynamics (see 16] for details). I think that there are still a lot of things left that engineers can learn from remembering in natural systems, which (as it becomes more and more obvious) is a central part for human cognition. The way how impairments of short-or long-term memory part could in uence behavior and personality can for instance be found in 26]. A constructivist, dynamic account of remembering seems to be most promising and a lot of research is done in this eld. In my view this should be linked to the aspect that \memory is primarily a vehicle for personal meanings and for grounding of the self, and that accuracy is secondary to this role " 13] . An important aspect in arti cial intelligence research on knowledge and memory is consistency. Various algorithms have been developed in order to manage a consistent knowledge or data base. On the other hand, humans easily seem to cope with this problem. There is much evidence that the problem of consistency itself is an arti cial one. Instead, the subjective impression of being a static`personality' is an illusion and might only be a good approximation on small time-scales, 1]. Humans seem to integrate and interpret new experiences on the basis of previous ones. Previous experiences are reconstructed with the actual body and context as the point of reference. In this way past and presence are closely coupled. In combination with human capabilities of rehearsal (as the basis for acting and planning) this coupling is linked to the future. Humans do not seem to worry much about consistency, they give explanations for their behavior on the basis of a story, a dynamically updated script, their autobiography. Believability of this story (to both oneself and others) seem to be more crucial than consistency.
In order to account for this autobiographic aspect of the individual we de ne the concept of an autobiographic agent as an embodied agent which dynamically reconstructs its individual`history' (autobiography) during its life-time. In the context of the physical-psychological state-space the concept of an autobiographic agent is important in order to account for dynamical changes of the state-space which nevertheless always refer to the embodied system and its`history' as an individual.
Social intelligence
In 14] I argued for the need to study the development of arti cial social intelligence for autonomous agents, focussing on robots. My argumentation was twofold: (1) social intelligence is a necessary prequisite for scenarios in which groups of autonomous agents should cooperatively solve a given task or survial as a group, (2) social intelligence is supposed to be the basis for intelligence as such in the evolution of primate species. According to the social intelligence hypothesis primate intelligence \originally evolved to solve social problems and was only later extended to problems outside the social domain" ( 11] , see also 9], 10] for an overview about discussions along this line of argumentation). For readers from the social science community the assumption that social dynamics were an important (or primary) driving force for the evolution of human intelligence might not at all seem new or provocative. Nevertheless, in the articial intelligence and cognitive science commu-nity the concept of intelligence is still fundamentally shaped by`rational' concerns like knowlege representation, planning and problem-solving. As an example I like to cite a recent statement in 20] who de nes machine intelligence as \intelligence is optimal problem solving in pursuit of speci c goals under resource constraints." (explicitly avoiding any reference to human intelligence or cognition).
In my notion of social intelligence the directed interaction between individuals is the focus of attention. In our view such communication situations are based on synchronization processes which lead to both external coordination of behaviors (including speech acts) and, on the internal, subjective, phenomenological side, to empathic understanding which can give rise to certain qualities of social understanding and social learning (see 16] , 15]).
We propose a de nition of the term social intelligence as the individual's capability to develop and manage relationships between individualized, autobiographic agents which, by means of communication, build up shared social interaction structures which help to integrate and manage the individual's basic (`sel sh') interests in relationship to the interests of the social system at the next higher level (family and friends as small groups with strong social bonding mechanisms, larger groups in business and economy, up to large anonymous communities like nations). The term arti cial social intelligence is then an instantiation of social intelligence in artifacts.
The next section gives an example of a physcial agent, a robot, which is dynamically coupled to its environment.
Dynamic Robots: The Seesaw Example
Most scenarios with autonomous robots use a`plain' environment, i.e. the robot is moving on a plane in a maze-like environment, e.g. on an o ce oor. Most of these robots do not face the problem of balance, either because their mass center point is very low or they move and accelerate very slowly. For the study of my main research issues, namely social interactions between robots ( 14]), I built up a hilly landscape, the`Huegellandschaft'. In association with a project on sewage robots 2 I also did some design studies on robots moving in plastic pipes. One important common property of these di erent experimental environments is the problem of keeping balance. The problem of balance is a well studied task in classical control theory. It is also addressed as a model optimization or learning task (the cart-pole system, e.g. see 2]). Actively controlling the orientation of the body axis is important for robots to prevent the robot from overturning and to improve the performance of the behavior, e.g. it in uences energy consumption. Since in these`habitats' a lot of other parameters in uence the behavior of the robots I decided to focus on the problem of balance and study it in a simple environment. This approach towards constructing`special-purpose-environments' is supplementary to lines of research which focus on how adequate designs for robot morphologies could be chosen or evolved in a given environment ( 27] ). I decided to build a seesaw as a dynamic and interactive' environment. The primary goal was not to nd an e cient algorithm which is better than existing solutions in control theory to the balancing problem. The goals for this endeavour were rather 1) controlling a balancing robot by using a behavior-oriented design approach, 2) nd a`cheap' solution to a transportable robot-environment system which can be used for demonstration purposes and 3) providing the system with an`interactive' aspect which allows humans to interact with the system and explore the characteristics of the system. Interactivity has two aspects in this experiment 1) the seesaw immediately`reacts' to the robot's movements which in turn in uences the movements of the robot and 2) humans, too, can interact with the seesaw and therefore manipulate the robot-environment interactions. In 15] I therefore use the seesaw experiments in order to discuss the role of the human observer and designer as an active embodied agent who is biased towards interpreting the world in terms of intentionality and explanation.
My approach to investigate balance did not use robots which are balancing themselves in a stable environment (see 23] for impressive example of this), rather the robots have to maintain a certain relationship to their dynamically changing environment.
Experimental setup
The construction of the system required the necessity of robot-environment coadaptations concerning hardware and physical, dynamical characteristics of robotenvironment interactions.
The Robots
The experiments are performed with small robots, which are built by using schertechnik components. I use such robots as research models in order to implement and test principles of robot design and control. The robots have two driven front wheels, contact switches (binary inputs) and analogue tilt sensors. In order to have a very simple`sensitive body surface', each robot has a belt around its body which is attached to contact sensors. The robots are at maximum 35 cm long and 35 cm wide. The mean velocities on a plane with full battery power and the motor quantities set to full speed are 5.3 cm/s. On board the robots are equipped with energy supply (batteries, 9.6V) and a special on-board computer, the`sensory-motor-brick'. We used two robots with slighty di erent shapes with a weight of 2kg.
The Seesaw
The seesaw consists of a wooden plate (thickness 1cm) and one or two supporting plastic hemispheres. Fig. 3 describes the main technical characteristics. Especially when two robots balance on the seesaw the border (height 6cm) prevents them from falling o the seesaw. The hemispheres can be used in any position and result in a seesaw which can change its orientation with one or two degrees of freedom (DOF). Seesaws with di erent tilting characteristics can therefore easily be constructed. In the experiments the hemispheres were chosen such that without any robot the wooden plate has a horizontal position (zero position). The hemisheres were used because they allow a`smooth' tilting of the seesaw. The selection of the right material for the upper part of seesaw was di cult, because the weight of the robots and the seesaw had to be coadapted. In the nal implementation the`sensitivity' of the seesaw is very high, i.e. near the zero position slight movements of the robots cause a slight tilting of the seesaw. Previous implementations, with less`sensitive' tilting behavior, impaired the possibilities of controlling the robot's balancing behavior. On top of each robot a small diode is attached. Above the seesaw a black-and-white video camera is mounted. The trajectories of the robots on the seesaw (from a birds eye view) are calculated by tracing the light sources in the video images. In this way the seesaw is represented as a 200x280 pixel array.
Behavior-oriented control
The robots are controlled using the behavior-oriented approach and a C-based programming language (PDL 3 : Process Description Language, 31]). PDL belongs to the category of behavior-oriented control approaches (opposed to action-selection mechanisms). Many AI and action selection approaches use a so-called`top-down' strategy: analysis of sensor data, using this data as input to modelling/planning processes, using this output as input to selecting and executing a certain action (like turn-90degrees-left, grab-object, go-to-location-xy). The basic idea of behaviororiented control (`bottom-up') is to have a set of more primitive units which are triggered by sensor data (and internal states). A speci c behavior in a concrete situation is not programmed explicitly, but results out of the interactions of a set of these units which are`activated' in this speci c context. The main characteristics of PDL are the concepts of`quantities' and`processes'. The processes are mappings between the incoming stream of values of the sensor quantities and the outgoing stream of values of the actuator quantities. The processes do not inhibit or activate each other, they are executed in parallel. There is no hierarchy of processes. The in uences of the processes on the actuators are summed and executed in each PDL cycle. The processes consist of AddValue(q,x) statements, increasing the value of quantity q (Value(q)) by value x. In this way it is possible to implement an incremental change of the quantity values. Each PDL process does not specify or trigger a speci c behavior, they rather specify how the system should change in speci c situations. A set of PDL processes can, in a speci c context, yield to a speci c behavior. But a single PDL processes can belong to di erent sets of`behaviors'.`Behaviors' (generally considered as observable agent-environment regularities) are not part of the control program, they are only observable when the system is put into a speci c real-world context. The PDL approach is an alternative to another popular behavior-oriented approach, the subsumption architecture which de nes behaviors and relations (e.g. inhibition) among them ( 7] ). Excellent introductions to the bottom-up approach towards complex behavior can be found in 8] and 32].
Experiments and Results
In the following we describe a few experiments conducted with the seesaw. The balancing problem is approached by using a hill-climbing strategy. We used a realization of hill-climbing in PDL by de ning two processes: turning-on-the-spot (turnRobot) and translation (climbRobot). Note that there is no process called`balance'. The main processes of the control program are described in the following in pseudo-code. Additional processes for obstacle avoidance (obstacles could be other robots on the seesaw or the plates which form the border of the seesaw) are not described here.
Trajectory traces document the experiments. The orientation of the body axis is measured with analogue inclination sensors, xed on the robot's chassis in rectangular orientation to each other. Quantity IncFB measures the orientation of thè head-tail' axis (forward-backward), IncLR measures the left-right body axis. Since the exploration of the`habitat' is not an important part of the experiments the robot has no default forward movement behavior. The values of the quantities SetPointFB and SetPointLR represent the`desired' orientations of the body axis, i.e. the control program achieves a`desired situation' when the set point values equal the values of the inclination quantities. Some xed values which are used by the PDL processes have been speci ed experimentally. The experiments which are described in the following sections are conducted following a speci c procedure: (1) the seesaw is build up according to the desired movement characteristics (one or two DOF, see g. 3 a) and b)), the wooden plate in zero position. Then the robot is put to a speci c initial position I on the seesaw. Then two binary switches which are attached to the robot are used to initialize the set point quantities for both inclination sensors. Thus, the experimenter is setting the body orientations which the robot`tries' to achieve. Fig. 3 c) shows two initial positions I0 and I1 which were investigated. For the experiments which are described in this paper only IO was used, namely when the robot's body axis has an horizontal orientation.
The robot is then positioned on a speci c start position S, g 3 shows four start positions. Starting from these positions the robot`tries' to achieve the orientation of its body axis which it had previously at the initial position I0.
Two degrees of freedom
The robot balances on a seesaw with two DOF. We list the pdl processes which cause this behavior. endprocess If at iteration cycle t the values of the inclination sensors equal the set point values then because of the additive principle of PDL the motorquantities will keep their values which they had at t-1. In order to prevent the robot from changes in direction with high frequency near the set point (which in the long run impairs the robot's mechanical parts) a stop process is necessary. Fig. 5 c) shows the trajectory of a robot without a stop process. The duration of the experiment is 149 seconds. Arrows indicate the start positions. The X and Y axis of the diagrams (values measured in pixel) refer to the surface of the seesaw (see g. 3). Fig. 5 a) depicts the trajectories of a robot from the same start positions in four trials. The`stable' end position is achieved by explicitely including a stop process. 
One degreee of freedom
The processes turnRobot and climbRobot from section 2.6 are used. The only di erence is that in process turnRobot the quantity E ect is set to 50. This is an adaptation to the di erent moving characterists of the 1DOF-seesaw in comparison to the 2DOF version. An interesting e ect which occurred regularily in the 1 DOF experiments is the`oszillation' while, similar to a resonance e ect, seesaw and robot change direction with similar frequency. Fig. 5 d) gives an example. The seesaw in this experiment is moving around the diagonal axis from the upper left to the lower right corner, connecting the hemispheres. Fig. 5 d) (left part) shows that the robot spent a considerable time moving back and forth around the same position. In parallel to the registration of the trajectories we videotaped the experiments. In this particular situation a`resonance e ect' occurred. The turning frequency of the seesaw matched the turning frequency of the robot. For a few seconds, when both movements were`in phase', the amplitude of the seesaw increased until slight shifts occured and the robot-environment system went out of phase. The robot had no means of detecting such an (from an observer point of view) interesting situation in terms of dynamics. For future investigations it might be interesting to have a robot which is able to control and evoke such situations, like a child sitting on a swing and trying to increase the amplitude.
We did not use any kind of location or mapping of the seesaw-environment. Thus, the robot could achieve its`desired' orientation at a position on the seesaw which is di erent from the initial position I. Fig. 5 d) shows that with 1 DOF the`desired' orientation can be achieved at positions along the diagonal axis. However, with 2 DOF's the horizontal position could only be achieved close to the initial position.
The previous sections of this paper described investigations in the balancing behavior of mobile robots moving in a dynamic`habitat'. We demonstrated how a simple environment can be constructed in order to investigate balance. The balancing problem was solved by (1) exploiting the dynamic robot-environment interactions and (2) using a parallel, behavior-oriented control architecture. The global pattern of`balancing behavior' (from an observer point of view) results out of the interactions of a few processes which only use information about the current position of the robot's body axis. If more than one robot is moving on a seesaw deadlock situations might occur, e.g. if the robots compete for a`desired' goal orientation (see g. 4a)). First tests had been conducted with such situations. Interaction between the robots occurs both directly (obstacle avoidance in case of physical contact) and indirectly via modi cations of the environment. Fig. 4 b) shows a more stable situation after the competitors have adapted their inclination set points (goal orientation) to the values they perceived during competition. The idea behind this is that the robot itself should be able to change its constraints or`goals'. The resulting group pattern also represents a certain`hierarchy' (without explicitly encoded in the robots' behavior), because only robot A was able to reach the initial`goal', depending on the (weight) distribution of the other robots. This control strategy could be a simple but e ective means of (1) adapting to slow dynamical changes of the environment, (2) avoiding certain deadlock situations and (3) allowing adaptation to the social environment which is relevant in collective behavior experiments. Thus, the seesaw might also be an interesting environment for collective intelligence experiments.
Outlook: Collective behavior experiments

Summary and Conclusion
My arguments about embodiment can be summarised as follows: 1) Embodiment is linked to a concept of a body and is not necessarily given when running a control program on robot hardware.
2) I introduced the concept of`body image' which is in my conception a dynamically re-constructed pattern (attractor) capturing both robot-environment interactions as well as the robot's`internal dynamics'.
3) Embodiment should always be seen as a characteristic of an individual and socially embedded cognitive system. 4) Studying embodiment for artifacts might contribute to bridge the gap between phenomenological understanding (which is grounded in a lived body) and the computationalistic approaches which traditionally dominate computer science and cognitive science. The study of experiential, bodily understanding could be a promising path towards intelligent artifacts. 5) I outlined the framework of the physical-psychological state-space which changes dynamically in a self-modifying way as a holistic approach towards embodied human and arti cial cognition. This is opposed to other structuralist approaches which are well known in arti cial intelligence and cognitive science, namely, assuming di erent cognitive modules located inside a system. The metaphor of a physical-psychological state-space is meant as a basis for discussions about a common framework for cognitive architectures comprising natural and arti cial systems. 6 ) In order to stress the importance of a dynamic memory we introduced the concept of an`autobiographical agent'. It is de ned as an embodied agent which dynamically reconstructs its individual`history' during its life-time. Thus, an embodied cognitive agent has to be good at storytelling (telling believable stories of its own autobiography).
The second part of this paper described experiments with a physical system which is dynamically coupled to its environment. We discussed balancing behavior of mobile robots moving in a dynamic`habitat'. The motivation to use an`ecological approach', i.e. studying this issue in a co-adapted robot-environment system, originates in the assumption that robot research could learn from natural systems (animals and plants) which by their morphology and behavior remind us of their adaptation (in ontogeny as well as phylogeny) to biotic and abiotic environmental parameters which, in an ongoing process, shape their`brains and bodies'.
We demonstrated how a simple environment can be constructed in order to investigate balance. The balancing problem was solved by (1) exploiting the dynamic robot-environment interactions and (2) using a parallel, behavior-oriented control architecture. The global pattern of`balancing behavior' (from an observer point of view) results out of the interactions of a few processes which only use information about the current position of the robot's body axis.
If we interpret the experiment described in section 2 along the conceptions of embodiment which are described in section 1 then we arrive at the following conclusion: The robot is situated, since it completely depends on on-line, real world sensor data which are used directly in a behavior-oriented control architecture. We did not use any simulation. The robot does not utilize any world model. The robot is embedded, since robot and environment are considered as one system, e.g. as we will show design and dynamic behavior had to be carefully co-adapted. However, in comparison to natural living systems the robot has a weak status of embodiment, following the physical-psychological state-space framework. E.g. the body of the robot is static, the position and characteristics of the sensors and actuators are modi ed and adapted to the environment by hand, not by genuine development. The body (the robot's mechanical and electronical parts ) is not`living', and its state does not depend on the internal dynamics of the control program. If the robot's batteries are switched o (the robot`dies'), the robot's body still remains in the same state. This is a fundamental di erence to living systems. If the dynamics (chemical-physiological processes) inside a cell stop, then the system dies, it loses its structure, dissipates and cannot be reconstructed (revived). Thus, to design an embodied system is still a big challenge, but rst steps have been taken.
